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@ -1,5 +1,155 @@
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//import 'package:omemo_dart/omemo_dart.dart';
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import 'dart:convert';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/omemo_dart.dart';
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void main() {
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/// This example aims to demonstrate how omemo_dart is used. Since omemo_dart is not
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// TODO(PapaTutuWawa): Currently NOOP
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/// dependent on any XMPP library, you need to convert stanzas to the appropriate
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/// intermediary format and back.
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void main() async {
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const aliceJid = 'alice@some.server';
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const bobJid = 'bob@other.serve';
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// You are Alice and want to begin using OMEMO, so you first create a SessionManager
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final aliceSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
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// The bare Jid of Alice as a String
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aliceJid,
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// The trust manager we want to use. In this case, we use the provided one that
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// implements "Blind Trust Before Verification". To make things simpler, we keep
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// no persistent data and can thus use the MemoryBTBVTrustManager. If we wanted to keep
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// the state, we would have to override BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager.
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MemoryBTBVTrustManager(),
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// Here we specify how many Onetime Prekeys we want to have. XEP-0384 recommends around
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// 100 OPKs, so let's generate 100. The parameter defaults to 100.
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//opkAmount: 100,
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);
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// Alice now wants to chat with Bob at his bare Jid "bob@other.server". To make things
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// simple, we just generate the identity bundle ourselves. In the real world, we would
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// request it using PEP and then convert the device bundle into a OmemoBundle object.
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final bobSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
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bobJid,
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MemoryBTBVTrustManager(),
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// Just for illustrative purposes
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opkAmount: 1,
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);
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// Alice prepares to send the message to Bob, so she builds the message stanza and
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// collects all the children of the stanza that should be encrypted into a string.
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const aliceMessageStanzaBody = '''
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<body>Hello Bob, it's me, Alice!</body>
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<super-secret-element xmlns='super-secret-element' />
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''';
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// Since OMEMO 0.8.3 mandates usage of XEP-0420: Stanza Content Encryption, we have to
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// wrap our acual payload - aliceMessageStanzaBody - into an SCE envelope. Note that
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// the rpad element must contain a random string. See XEP-0420 for recommendations.
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// OMEMO makes the <time /> element optional, but let's use for this example.
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const envelope = '''
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<envelope xmlns='urn:xmpp:sce:1'>
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<content>
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$aliceMessageStanzaBody
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</content>
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<rpad>s0m3-r4nd0m-b9t3s</rpad>
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<from jid='$aliceJid' />
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<time stamp='1969-07-20T21:56:15-05:00' />
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</envelope>
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''';
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// Since Alice has no open session with Bob, we need to tell the session manager to build
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// it when sending the message.
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final message = await aliceSession.encryptToJid(
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// The bare receiver Jid
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bobJid,
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// The envelope we want to encrypt
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envelope,
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// Since this is the first time Alice contacts Bob from this device, we need to create
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// a new session. Let's also assume that Bob only has one device. We may, however,
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// add more bundles to newSessions, if we know of more.
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newSessions: [
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await (await bobSession.getDevice()).toBundle(),
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],
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);
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// Alice now builds the actual message stanza for Bob
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final payload = base64.encode(message.ciphertext!);
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final aliceDevice = await aliceSession.getDevice();
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// ignore: unused_local_variable
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final bobDevice = await bobSession.getDevice();
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// Since we know we have just one key for Bob, we take a shortcut. However, in the real
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// world, we have to serialise every EncryptedKey to a <key /> element and group them
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// per Jid.
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final key = message.encryptedKeys[0];
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// Note that the key's "kex" attribute refers to key.kex. It just means that the
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// encrypted key also contains the required data for Bob to build a session with Alice.
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// ignore: unused_local_variable
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final aliceStanza = '''
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<message from='$aliceJid/device1' to='$bobJid/device2'>
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<encrypted xmlns='urn:xmpp:omemo:2'>
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<header sid='${aliceDevice.id}'>
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<keys jid='$bobJid'>
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<key rid='${key.rid} kex='true'>
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${key.value}
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</key>
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</keys>
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</header>
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<payload>
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$payload
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</payload>
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</encrypted>
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</message>
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''';
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// Alice can now send this message to Bob using our preferred XMPP library.
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// ...
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// Bob now receives an OMEMO encrypted message from Alice and wants to decrypt it.
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// Since we have just one key, let's just deserialise the one key by hand.
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final keys = [
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EncryptedKey(bobJid, key.rid, key.value, true),
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];
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// Bob extracts the payload and attempts to decrypt it.
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// ignore: unused_local_variable
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final bobMessage = await bobSession.decryptMessage(
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// base64 decode the payload
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base64.decode(payload),
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// Specify the Jid of the sender
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aliceJid,
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// Specify the device identifier of the sender (the "sid" attribute of <header />)
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aliceDevice.id,
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// The deserialised keys
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keys,
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);
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// All Bob has to do now is replace the OMEMO wrapper element
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// <encrypted xmlns='urn:xmpp:omemo:2' />) with the content of the <content /> element
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// of the envelope we just decrypted.
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// Bob now has a session with Alice and can send encrypted message to her.
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// Since they both used the BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager, they currently
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// use blind trust, meaning that both Alice and Bob accept new devices without any
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// hesitation. If Alice, however, decides to verify one of Bob's devices and sets
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// it as verified using
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// ```
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// await aliceSession.trustManager.setDeviceTrust(bobJid, bobDevice.id, BTBVTrustState.verified)
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// ```
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// then Alice's OmemoSessionManager won't encrypt to new devices unless they are also
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// verified. To prevent user confusion, you should check if every device is trusted
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// before sending the message and ask the user for a trust decision.
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// If you want to make the BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager persistent, then
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// you need to subclass it and override the `Future<void> commitState()` and
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// `Future<void> loadState()` functions. commitState is called everytime the internal
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// state gets changed. loadState never gets automatically called but is more of a
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// function for the user to restore the trust manager. In those functions you have
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// access to `ratchetMap`, which maps a `RatchetMapKey` - essentially a tuple consisting
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// of a bare Jid and the device identifier - to the trust state, and `devices` which
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// maps a bare Jid to its device identifiers.
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// To make the entire OmemoSessionManager persistent, you have two options:
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// - use the provided `toJson()` and `fromJson()` functions. They, however, serialise
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// and deserialise *ALL* known sessions, so it might be slow.
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// - subscribe to the session manager's `eventStream`. There, events get triggered
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// everytime a ratchet changes, our own device changes or the internal ratchet map
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// gets changed. This give finer control over the the serialisation. The session
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// manager can then be restored using its constructor. For a list of events, see
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// lib/src/omemo/events.dart.
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}
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}
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@ -2,14 +2,15 @@ library omemo_dart;
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export 'src/double_ratchet/double_ratchet.dart';
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export 'src/double_ratchet/double_ratchet.dart';
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export 'src/errors.dart';
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export 'src/errors.dart';
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export 'src/events.dart';
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export 'src/helpers.dart';
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export 'src/helpers.dart';
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export 'src/keys.dart';
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export 'src/keys.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/bundle.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/bundle.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/device.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/device.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/encryption_result.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/encryption_result.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/events.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/fingerprint.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/fingerprint.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/ratchet_map_key.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/sessionmanager.dart';
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export 'src/omemo/sessionmanager.dart';
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export 'src/trust/base.dart';
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export 'src/trust/base.dart';
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export 'src/trust/btbv.dart';
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export 'src/trust/btbv.dart';
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@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
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import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
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import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
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@internal
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@immutable
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@immutable
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class RatchetMapKey {
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class RatchetMapKey {
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@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/crypto.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/crypto.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/double_ratchet/double_ratchet.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/double_ratchet/double_ratchet.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/errors.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/errors.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/events.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/helpers.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/helpers.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/keys.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/keys.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/bundle.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/bundle.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/device.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/device.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encryption_result.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encryption_result.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/events.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/fingerprint.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/fingerprint.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/ratchet_map_key.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/ratchet_map_key.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_authenticated_message.dart';
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import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_authenticated_message.dart';
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@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
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/// The trust manager
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/// The trust manager
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final TrustManager _trustManager;
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final TrustManager _trustManager;
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TrustManager get trustManager => _trustManager;
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/// A stream that receives events regarding the session
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/// A stream that receives events regarding the session
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Stream<OmemoEvent> get eventStream => _eventStreamController.stream;
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Stream<OmemoEvent> get eventStream => _eventStreamController.stream;
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@ -224,8 +225,11 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
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// We assume that the user already checked if the session exists
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// We assume that the user already checked if the session exists
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for (final jid in jids) {
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for (final jid in jids) {
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for (final deviceId in _deviceMap[jid]!) {
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for (final deviceId in _deviceMap[jid]!) {
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// Only encrypt to devices that are trusted
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// Empty OMEMO messages are allowed to bypass trust
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if (!(await _trustManager.isTrusted(jid, deviceId))) continue;
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if (plaintext != null) {
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// Only encrypt to devices that are trusted
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if (!(await _trustManager.isTrusted(jid, deviceId))) continue;
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}
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final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId);
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final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId);
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final ratchet = _ratchetMap[ratchetKey]!;
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final ratchet = _ratchetMap[ratchetKey]!;
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@ -13,29 +13,33 @@ enum BTBVTrustState {
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verified,
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verified,
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}
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}
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class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
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/// A TrustManager that implements the idea of Blind Trust Before Verification.
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/// See https://gultsch.de/trust.html for more details.
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abstract class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
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BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager()
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BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager()
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: _trustCache = {},
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: trustCache = {},
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_devices = {},
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devices = {},
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_lock = Lock();
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_lock = Lock();
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/// The cache for Mapping a RatchetMapKey to its trust state
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/// The cache for Mapping a RatchetMapKey to its trust state
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final Map<RatchetMapKey, BTBVTrustState> _trustCache;
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@protected
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final Map<RatchetMapKey, BTBVTrustState> trustCache;
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/// Mapping of Jids to their device identifiers
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/// Mapping of Jids to their device identifiers
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final Map<String, List<int>> _devices;
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@protected
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final Map<String, List<int>> devices;
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/// The lock for _devices and _trustCache
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/// The lock for devices and trustCache
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final Lock _lock;
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final Lock _lock;
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/// Returns true if [jid] has at least one device that is verified. If not, returns false.
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/// Returns true if [jid] has at least one device that is verified. If not, returns false.
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/// Note that this function accesses _devices and _trustCache, which requires that the
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/// Note that this function accesses devices and trustCache, which requires that the
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/// lock for those two maps (_lock) has been aquired before calling.
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/// lock for those two maps (_lock) has been aquired before calling.
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bool _hasAtLeastOneVerifiedDevice(String jid) {
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bool _hasAtLeastOneVerifiedDevice(String jid) {
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if (!_devices.containsKey(jid)) return false;
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if (!devices.containsKey(jid)) return false;
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return _devices[jid]!.any((id) {
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return devices[jid]!.any((id) {
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return _trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, id)]! == BTBVTrustState.verified;
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return trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, id)]! == BTBVTrustState.verified;
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});
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});
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}
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}
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@ -43,7 +47,7 @@ class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
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Future<bool> isTrusted(String jid, int deviceId) async {
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Future<bool> isTrusted(String jid, int deviceId) async {
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var returnValue = false;
|
var returnValue = false;
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await _lock.synchronized(() async {
|
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
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final trustCacheValue = _trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)];
|
final trustCacheValue = trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)];
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if (trustCacheValue == BTBVTrustState.notTrusted) {
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if (trustCacheValue == BTBVTrustState.notTrusted) {
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returnValue = false;
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returnValue = false;
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return;
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return;
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@ -71,16 +75,19 @@ class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
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Future<void> onNewSession(String jid, int deviceId) async {
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Future<void> onNewSession(String jid, int deviceId) async {
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await _lock.synchronized(() async {
|
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
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if (_hasAtLeastOneVerifiedDevice(jid)) {
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if (_hasAtLeastOneVerifiedDevice(jid)) {
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_trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)] = BTBVTrustState.notTrusted;
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trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)] = BTBVTrustState.notTrusted;
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} else {
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} else {
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_trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)] = BTBVTrustState.blindTrust;
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trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)] = BTBVTrustState.blindTrust;
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||||||
}
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}
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||||||
|
|
||||||
if (_devices.containsKey(jid)) {
|
if (devices.containsKey(jid)) {
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_devices[jid]!.add(deviceId);
|
devices[jid]!.add(deviceId);
|
||||||
} else {
|
} else {
|
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_devices[jid] = List<int>.from([deviceId]);
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devices[jid] = List<int>.from([deviceId]);
|
||||||
}
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}
|
||||||
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|
||||||
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// Commit the state
|
||||||
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await commitState();
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||||||
});
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});
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||||||
}
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}
|
||||||
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|
||||||
@ -89,8 +96,8 @@ class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
|
|||||||
final map = <int, BTBVTrustState>{};
|
final map = <int, BTBVTrustState>{};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
|
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
|
||||||
for (final deviceId in _devices[jid]!) {
|
for (final deviceId in devices[jid]!) {
|
||||||
map[deviceId] = _trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)]!;
|
map[deviceId] = trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)]!;
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -100,10 +107,33 @@ class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
|
|||||||
/// Sets the trust of [jid]'s device with identifier [deviceId] to [state].
|
/// Sets the trust of [jid]'s device with identifier [deviceId] to [state].
|
||||||
Future<void> setDeviceTrust(String jid, int deviceId, BTBVTrustState state) async {
|
Future<void> setDeviceTrust(String jid, int deviceId, BTBVTrustState state) async {
|
||||||
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
|
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
|
||||||
_trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)] = state;
|
trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)] = state;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Commit the state
|
||||||
|
await commitState();
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Called when the state of the trust manager has been changed. Allows the user to
|
||||||
|
/// commit the trust state to persistent storage.
|
||||||
|
@visibleForOverriding
|
||||||
|
Future<void> commitState();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Called when the user wants to restore the state of the trust manager. The format
|
||||||
|
/// and actual storage mechanism is left to the user.
|
||||||
|
@visibleForOverriding
|
||||||
|
Future<void> loadState();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@visibleForTesting
|
@visibleForTesting
|
||||||
BTBVTrustState getDeviceTrust(String jid, int deviceId) => _trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)]!;
|
BTBVTrustState getDeviceTrust(String jid, int deviceId) => trustCache[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)]!;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// A BTBV TrustManager that does not commit its state to persistent storage. Well suited
|
||||||
|
/// for testing.
|
||||||
|
class MemoryBTBVTrustManager extends BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager {
|
||||||
|
@override
|
||||||
|
Future<void> commitState() async {}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@override
|
||||||
|
Future<void> loadState() async {}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
14
lib/src/trust/never.dart
Normal file
14
lib/src/trust/never.dart
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||||||
|
import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
|
||||||
|
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/base.dart';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Only use for testing!
|
||||||
|
/// An implementation of TrustManager that never trusts any device and thus
|
||||||
|
/// has no internal state.
|
||||||
|
@visibleForTesting
|
||||||
|
class NeverTrustingTrustManager extends TrustManager {
|
||||||
|
@override
|
||||||
|
Future<bool> isTrusted(String jid, int deviceId) async => false;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@override
|
||||||
|
Future<void> onNewSession(String jid, int deviceId) async {}
|
||||||
|
}
|
@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
|
|||||||
import 'package:omemo_dart/omemo_dart.dart';
|
import 'package:omemo_dart/omemo_dart.dart';
|
||||||
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/always.dart';
|
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/always.dart';
|
||||||
|
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/never.dart';
|
||||||
import 'package:test/test.dart';
|
import 'package:test/test.dart';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
void main() {
|
void main() {
|
||||||
@ -336,4 +337,34 @@ void main() {
|
|||||||
);
|
);
|
||||||
expect(messagePlaintext, bobMessage);
|
expect(messagePlaintext, bobMessage);
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test('Test trust bypassing with empty OMEMO messages', () async {
|
||||||
|
const aliceJid = 'alice@server.example';
|
||||||
|
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server.example';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Alice and Bob generate their sessions
|
||||||
|
final aliceSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
|
||||||
|
aliceJid,
|
||||||
|
NeverTrustingTrustManager(),
|
||||||
|
opkAmount: 1,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
final bobSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
|
||||||
|
bobJid,
|
||||||
|
NeverTrustingTrustManager(),
|
||||||
|
opkAmount: 1,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Alice encrypts an empty message for Bob
|
||||||
|
final aliceMessage = await aliceSession.encryptToJid(
|
||||||
|
bobJid,
|
||||||
|
null,
|
||||||
|
newSessions: [
|
||||||
|
await (await bobSession.getDevice()).toBundle(),
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Despite Alice not trusting Bob's device, we should have encrypted it for his
|
||||||
|
// untrusted device.
|
||||||
|
expect(aliceMessage.encryptedKeys.length, 1);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import 'package:test/test.dart';
|
|||||||
void main() {
|
void main() {
|
||||||
test('Test the Blind Trust Before Verification TrustManager', () async {
|
test('Test the Blind Trust Before Verification TrustManager', () async {
|
||||||
// Caroline's BTBV manager
|
// Caroline's BTBV manager
|
||||||
final btbv = BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager();
|
final btbv = MemoryBTBVTrustManager();
|
||||||
// Example data
|
// Example data
|
||||||
const aliceJid = 'alice@some.server';
|
const aliceJid = 'alice@some.server';
|
||||||
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server';
|
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server';
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user