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10 changed files with 32 additions and 412 deletions

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@ -4,24 +4,9 @@ import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
class RatchetMapKey {
const RatchetMapKey(this.jid, this.deviceId);
factory RatchetMapKey.fromJsonKey(String key) {
final parts = key.split(':');
final deviceId = int.parse(parts.first);
return RatchetMapKey(
parts.sublist(1).join(':'),
deviceId,
);
}
final String jid;
final int deviceId;
String toJsonKey() {
return '$deviceId:$jid';
}
@override
bool operator ==(Object other) {
return other is RatchetMapKey && jid == other.jid && deviceId == other.deviceId;

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@ -177,17 +177,15 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
// Pick the correct SPK
final device = await getDevice();
OmemoKeyPair? spk;
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
if (kex.spkId == _device.spkId) {
spk = _device.spk;
} else if (kex.spkId == _device.oldSpkId) {
spk = _device.oldSpk;
}
});
if (spk == null) {
if (kex.spkId == device.spkId) {
spk = device.spk;
} else if (kex.spkId == device.oldSpkId) {
spk = device.oldSpk;
} else {
throw UnknownSignedPrekeyException();
}
assert(spk != null, 'The used SPK must be found');
final kexResult = await x3dhFromInitialMessage(
X3DHMessage(
@ -200,7 +198,7 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
device.ik,
);
final ratchet = await OmemoDoubleRatchet.acceptNewSession(
spk!,
spk,
OmemoPublicKey.fromBytes(kex.ik!, KeyPairType.ed25519),
kexResult.sk,
kexResult.ad,
@ -299,25 +297,6 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
);
}
/// In case a decryption error occurs, the Double Ratchet spec says to just restore
/// the ratchet to its old state. As such, this function restores the ratchet at
/// [mapKey] with [oldRatchet].
Future<void> _restoreRatchet(RatchetMapKey mapKey, OmemoDoubleRatchet oldRatchet) async {
await _lock.synchronized(() {
print('RESTORING RATCHETS');
_ratchetMap[mapKey] = oldRatchet;
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(
RatchetModifiedEvent(
mapKey.jid,
mapKey.deviceId,
oldRatchet,
),
);
});
}
/// Attempt to decrypt [ciphertext]. [keys] refers to the <key /> elements inside the
/// <keys /> element with a "jid" attribute matching our own. [senderJid] refers to the
/// bare Jid of the sender. [senderDeviceId] refers to the "sid" attribute of the
@ -335,15 +314,9 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
throw NotEncryptedForDeviceException();
}
final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(senderJid, senderDeviceId);
final decodedRawKey = base64.decode(rawKey.value);
OmemoAuthenticatedMessage authMessage;
OmemoDoubleRatchet? oldRatchet;
if (rawKey.kex) {
// If the ratchet already existed, we store it. If it didn't, oldRatchet will stay
// null.
oldRatchet = await _getRatchet(ratchetKey);
// TODO(PapaTutuWawa): Only do this when we should
final kex = OmemoKeyExchange.fromBuffer(decodedRawKey);
await _addSessionFromKeyExchange(
@ -374,38 +347,31 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
}
final message = OmemoMessage.fromBuffer(authMessage.message!);
final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(senderJid, senderDeviceId);
List<int>? keyAndHmac;
// We can guarantee that the ratchet exists at this point in time
final ratchet = (await _getRatchet(ratchetKey))!;
oldRatchet ??= ratchet ;
try {
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
final ratchet = _ratchetMap[ratchetKey]!;
if (rawKey.kex) {
keyAndHmac = await ratchet.ratchetDecrypt(message, authMessage.writeToBuffer());
} else {
keyAndHmac = await ratchet.ratchetDecrypt(message, decodedRawKey);
}
} on InvalidMessageHMACException {
await _restoreRatchet(ratchetKey, oldRatchet);
rethrow;
}
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(RatchetModifiedEvent(senderJid, senderDeviceId, ratchet));
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(RatchetModifiedEvent(senderJid, senderDeviceId, ratchet));
});
// Empty OMEMO messages should just have the key decrypted and/or session set up.
if (ciphertext == null) {
return null;
}
final key = keyAndHmac.sublist(0, 32);
final hmac = keyAndHmac.sublist(32, 48);
final key = keyAndHmac!.sublist(0, 32);
final hmac = keyAndHmac!.sublist(32, 48);
final derivedKeys = await deriveEncryptionKeys(key, omemoPayloadInfoString);
final computedHmac = await truncatedHmac(ciphertext, derivedKeys.authenticationKey);
if (!listsEqual(hmac, computedHmac)) {
// TODO(PapaTutuWawa): I am unsure if we should restore the ratchet here
await _restoreRatchet(ratchetKey, oldRatchet);
throw InvalidMessageHMACException();
}
@ -475,24 +441,6 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
});
}
/// Removes all ratchets for Jid [jid]. Triggers a DeviceMapModified event at the end and an
/// RatchetRemovedEvent for each ratchet.
Future<void> removeAllRatchets(String jid) async {
await _lock.synchronized(() async {
for (final deviceId in _deviceMap[jid]!) {
// Remove the ratchet
_ratchetMap.remove(RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId));
// Commit it
_eventStreamController.add(RatchetRemovedEvent(jid, deviceId));
}
// Remove the device from jid
_deviceMap.remove(jid);
// Commit it
_eventStreamController.add(DeviceMapModifiedEvent(_deviceMap));
});
}
/// Returns the list of device identifiers belonging to [jid] that are yet unacked, i.e.
/// we have not yet received an empty OMEMO message from.
Future<List<int>?> getUnacknowledgedRatchets(String jid) async {
@ -548,12 +496,6 @@ class OmemoSessionManager {
_eventStreamController.add(DeviceModifiedEvent(_device));
});
}
Future<OmemoDoubleRatchet?> _getRatchet(RatchetMapKey key) async {
return _lock.synchronized(() async {
return _ratchetMap[key];
});
}
@visibleForTesting
OmemoDoubleRatchet getRatchet(String jid, int deviceId) => _ratchetMap[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)]!;

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@ -46,18 +46,21 @@ List<int> encodeVarint(int i) {
assert(i >= 0, "Two's complement is not implemented");
final ret = List<int>.empty(growable: true);
// Thanks to https://github.com/hathibelagal-dev/LEB128 for the trick with toRadixString!
final numSevenBlocks = (i.toRadixString(2).length / 7).ceil();
for (var j = 0; j < numSevenBlocks; j++) {
var j = 0;
while (true) {
// The 7 LSB of the byte we're creating
final x = (i & (lsb7Mask << j * 7)) >> j * 7;
// The next bits
final next = i & (lsb7Mask << (j + 1) * 7);
if (j == numSevenBlocks - 1) {
if (next == 0) {
// If we were to shift further, we only get zero, so we're at the end
ret.add(x);
break;
} else {
// We still have at least one bit more to go, so set the MSB to 1
ret.add(x + msb);
j++;
}
}

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@ -17,7 +17,4 @@ class AlwaysTrustingTrustManager extends TrustManager {
@override
Future<void> setEnabled(String jid, int deviceId, bool enabled) async {}
@override
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> toJson() async => <String, dynamic>{};
}

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@ -16,7 +16,4 @@ abstract class TrustManager {
/// Mark the device with id [deviceId] of Jid [jid] as enabled if [enabled] is true or as disabled
/// if [enabled] is false.
Future<void> setEnabled(String jid, int deviceId, bool enabled);
/// Serialize the trust manager to JSON.
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> toJson();
}

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@ -8,52 +8,29 @@ import 'package:synchronized/synchronized.dart';
/// - blindTrust: The fingerprint is not verified using OOB means
/// - verified: The fingerprint has been verified using OOB means
enum BTBVTrustState {
notTrusted, // = 1
blindTrust, // = 2
verified, // = 3
}
int _trustToInt(BTBVTrustState state) {
switch (state) {
case BTBVTrustState.notTrusted: return 1;
case BTBVTrustState.blindTrust: return 2;
case BTBVTrustState.verified: return 3;
}
}
BTBVTrustState _trustFromInt(int i) {
switch (i) {
case 1: return BTBVTrustState.notTrusted;
case 2: return BTBVTrustState.blindTrust;
case 3: return BTBVTrustState.verified;
default: return BTBVTrustState.notTrusted;
}
notTrusted,
blindTrust,
verified,
}
/// A TrustManager that implements the idea of Blind Trust Before Verification.
/// See https://gultsch.de/trust.html for more details.
abstract class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager({
Map<RatchetMapKey, BTBVTrustState>? trustCache,
Map<RatchetMapKey, bool>? enablementCache,
Map<String, List<int>>? devices,
}) : trustCache = trustCache ?? {},
enablementCache = enablementCache ?? {},
devices = devices ?? {},
_lock = Lock();
BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager()
: trustCache = {},
enablementCache = {},
devices = {},
_lock = Lock();
/// The cache for mapping a RatchetMapKey to its trust state
@visibleForTesting
@protected
final Map<RatchetMapKey, BTBVTrustState> trustCache;
/// The cache for mapping a RatchetMapKey to whether it is enabled or not
@visibleForTesting
@protected
final Map<RatchetMapKey, bool> enablementCache;
/// Mapping of Jids to their device identifiers
@visibleForTesting
@protected
final Map<String, List<int>> devices;
@ -164,50 +141,6 @@ abstract class BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager extends TrustManager {
// Commit the state
await commitState();
}
@override
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> toJson() async {
return {
'devices': devices,
'trust': trustCache.map((key, value) => MapEntry(
key.toJsonKey(), _trustToInt(value),
),),
'enable': enablementCache.map((key, value) => MapEntry(key.toJsonKey(), value)),
};
}
/// From a serialized version of a BTBV trust manager, extract the device list.
/// NOTE: This is needed as Dart cannot just cast a List<dynamic> to List<int> and so on.
static Map<String, List<int>> deviceListFromJson(Map<String, dynamic> json) {
return (json['devices']! as Map<String, dynamic>).map<String, List<int>>(
(key, value) => MapEntry(
key,
(value as List<dynamic>).map<int>((i) => i as int).toList(),
),
);
}
/// From a serialized version of a BTBV trust manager, extract the trust cache.
/// NOTE: This is needed as Dart cannot just cast a List<dynamic> to List<int> and so on.
static Map<RatchetMapKey, BTBVTrustState> trustCacheFromJson(Map<String, dynamic> json) {
return (json['trust']! as Map<String, dynamic>).map<RatchetMapKey, BTBVTrustState>(
(key, value) => MapEntry(
RatchetMapKey.fromJsonKey(key),
_trustFromInt(value as int),
),
);
}
/// From a serialized version of a BTBV trust manager, extract the enable cache.
/// NOTE: This is needed as Dart cannot just cast a List<dynamic> to List<int> and so on.
static Map<RatchetMapKey, bool> enableCacheFromJson(Map<String, dynamic> json) {
return (json['enable']! as Map<String, dynamic>).map<RatchetMapKey, bool>(
(key, value) => MapEntry(
RatchetMapKey.fromJsonKey(key),
value as bool,
),
);
}
/// Called when the state of the trust manager has been changed. Allows the user to
/// commit the trust state to persistent storage.

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@ -17,7 +17,4 @@ class NeverTrustingTrustManager extends TrustManager {
@override
Future<void> setEnabled(String jid, int deviceId, bool enabled) async {}
@override
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> toJson() async => <String, dynamic>{};
}

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@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ void main() {
expect(messagePlaintext, aliceMessage2);
});
test('Test sending empty OMEMO messages', () async {
test('Test using sending empty OMEMO messages', () async {
const aliceJid = 'alice@server.example';
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server.example';
@ -614,145 +614,4 @@ void main() {
expect(await aliceRatchet1.equals(aliceRatchet2), false);
expect(await bobRatchet1.equals(bobRatchet2), false);
});
test('Test receiving an old message that contains a KEX', () async {
const aliceJid = 'alice@server.example';
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server.example';
// Alice and Bob generate their sessions
final aliceSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
aliceJid,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
opkAmount: 1,
);
final bobSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
bobJid,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
opkAmount: 2,
);
// Alice sends Bob a message
final msg1 = await aliceSession.encryptToJid(
bobJid,
'Hallo Welt',
newSessions: [
await bobSession.getDeviceBundle(),
],
);
await bobSession.decryptMessage(
msg1.ciphertext,
aliceJid,
await aliceSession.getDeviceId(),
msg1.encryptedKeys,
);
// Bob responds
final msg2 = await bobSession.encryptToJid(
aliceJid,
'Hello!',
);
await aliceSession.decryptMessage(
msg2.ciphertext,
bobJid,
await bobSession.getDeviceId(),
msg2.encryptedKeys,
);
// Due to some issue with the transport protocol, the first message Bob received is
// received again
try {
await bobSession.decryptMessage(
msg1.ciphertext,
aliceJid,
await aliceSession.getDeviceId(),
msg1.encryptedKeys,
);
expect(true, false);
} on InvalidMessageHMACException {
// NOOP
}
final msg3 = await aliceSession.encryptToJid(
bobJid,
'Are you okay?',
);
final result = await bobSession.decryptMessage(
msg3.ciphertext,
aliceJid,
await aliceSession.getDeviceId(),
msg3.encryptedKeys,
);
expect(result, 'Are you okay?');
});
test('Test receiving an old message that does not contain a KEX', () async {
const aliceJid = 'alice@server.example';
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server.example';
// Alice and Bob generate their sessions
final aliceSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
aliceJid,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
opkAmount: 1,
);
final bobSession = await OmemoSessionManager.generateNewIdentity(
bobJid,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
opkAmount: 2,
);
// Alice sends Bob a message
final msg1 = await aliceSession.encryptToJid(
bobJid,
'Hallo Welt',
newSessions: [
await bobSession.getDeviceBundle(),
],
);
await bobSession.decryptMessage(
msg1.ciphertext,
aliceJid,
await aliceSession.getDeviceId(),
msg1.encryptedKeys,
);
// Bob responds
final msg2 = await bobSession.encryptToJid(
aliceJid,
'Hello!',
);
await aliceSession.decryptMessage(
msg2.ciphertext,
bobJid,
await bobSession.getDeviceId(),
msg2.encryptedKeys,
);
// Due to some issue with the transport protocol, the first message Alice received is
// received again.
try {
await aliceSession.decryptMessage(
msg2.ciphertext,
bobJid,
await bobSession.getDeviceId(),
msg2.encryptedKeys,
);
expect(true, false);
} catch (_) {
// NOOP
}
final msg3 = await aliceSession.encryptToJid(
bobJid,
'Are you okay?',
);
final result = await bobSession.decryptMessage(
msg3.ciphertext,
aliceJid,
await aliceSession.getDeviceId(),
msg3.encryptedKeys,
);
expect(result, 'Are you okay?');
});
}

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@ -48,10 +48,6 @@ void main() {
<int>[172, 2],
);
});
test('Test some special cases', () {
expect(decodeVarint(encodeVarint(1042464893), 0).n, 1042464893);
});
});
group('OMEMOMessage', () {
@ -174,13 +170,5 @@ void main() {
expect(decoded.message!.mac, <int>[5, 6, 8, 0]);
expect(decoded.message!.message, <int>[4, 5, 7, 3, 2]);
});
test('Test decoding an issue', () {
/*
final data = 'CAAQfRogc2GwslU219dUkrMHNM4KdZRmuFnBTae+bQaJ+55IsAMiII7aZKj2sUpb6xR/3Ari7WZUmKFV0G6czUc4NMvjKDBaKnwKEM2ZpI8X3TgcxhxwENANnlsSaAgAEAAaICy8T9WPgLb7RdYd8/4JkrLF0RahEkC3ZaEfk5jw3dsLIkBMILzLyByweLgF4lCn0oNea+kbdrFr6rY7r/7WyI8hXEQz38QpnN+jyGGwC7Ga0dq70WuyqE7VpiFArQwqZh2G';
final kex = OmemoKeyExchange.fromBuffer(base64Decode(data));
expect(kex.spkId!, 1042464893);
*/
});
});
}

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@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:omemo_dart/omemo_dart.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/always.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
@ -105,84 +104,4 @@ void main() {
expect(await oldRatchet.equals(newRatchet), true);
}
});
test('Test serialising and deserialising the BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager', () async {
// Caroline's BTBV manager
final btbv = MemoryBTBVTrustManager();
// Example data
const aliceJid = 'alice@some.server';
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server';
// Caroline starts a chat a device from Alice
await btbv.onNewSession(aliceJid, 1);
expect(await btbv.isTrusted(aliceJid, 1), true);
expect(await btbv.isEnabled(aliceJid, 1), true);
// Caroline meets with Alice and verifies her fingerprint
await btbv.setDeviceTrust(aliceJid, 1, BTBVTrustState.verified);
expect(await btbv.isTrusted(aliceJid, 1), true);
// Alice adds a new device
await btbv.onNewSession(aliceJid, 2);
expect(await btbv.isTrusted(aliceJid, 2), false);
expect(btbv.getDeviceTrust(aliceJid, 2), BTBVTrustState.notTrusted);
expect(await btbv.isEnabled(aliceJid, 2), false);
// Caronline starts a chat with Bob but since they live far apart, Caroline cannot
// verify his fingerprint.
await btbv.onNewSession(bobJid, 3);
// Bob adds a new device
await btbv.onNewSession(bobJid, 4);
expect(await btbv.isTrusted(bobJid, 3), true);
expect(await btbv.isTrusted(bobJid, 4), true);
expect(btbv.getDeviceTrust(bobJid, 3), BTBVTrustState.blindTrust);
expect(btbv.getDeviceTrust(bobJid, 4), BTBVTrustState.blindTrust);
expect(await btbv.isEnabled(bobJid, 3), true);
expect(await btbv.isEnabled(bobJid, 4), true);
});
test('Test serializing and deserializing RatchetMapKey', () {
const test1 = RatchetMapKey('user@example.org', 1234);
final result1 = RatchetMapKey.fromJsonKey(test1.toJsonKey());
expect(result1.jid, test1.jid);
expect(result1.deviceId, test1.deviceId);
const test2 = RatchetMapKey('user@example.org/hallo:welt', 3333);
final result2 = RatchetMapKey.fromJsonKey(test2.toJsonKey());
expect(result2.jid, test2.jid);
expect(result2.deviceId, test2.deviceId);
});
test('Test serializing and deserializing the components of the BTBV manager', () async {
// Caroline's BTBV manager
final btbv = MemoryBTBVTrustManager();
// Example data
const aliceJid = 'alice@some.server';
const bobJid = 'bob@other.server';
await btbv.onNewSession(aliceJid, 1);
await btbv.setDeviceTrust(aliceJid, 1, BTBVTrustState.verified);
await btbv.onNewSession(aliceJid, 2);
await btbv.onNewSession(bobJid, 3);
await btbv.onNewSession(bobJid, 4);
final managerJson = await btbv.toJson();
final managerString = jsonEncode(managerJson);
final managerPostJson = jsonDecode(managerString) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final deviceList = BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager.deviceListFromJson(
managerPostJson,
);
expect(btbv.devices, deviceList);
final trustCache = BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager.trustCacheFromJson(
managerPostJson,
);
expect(btbv.trustCache, trustCache);
final enableCache = BlindTrustBeforeVerificationTrustManager.enableCacheFromJson(
managerPostJson,
);
expect(btbv.enablementCache, enableCache);
});
}