feat: Begin work on the OmemoManager interface

This commit is contained in:
PapaTutuWawa 2022-12-25 22:13:08 +01:00
parent 06707d1a34
commit b48665c357
10 changed files with 877 additions and 16 deletions

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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ export 'src/omemo/events.dart';
export 'src/omemo/fingerprint.dart';
export 'src/omemo/ratchet_map_key.dart';
export 'src/omemo/sessionmanager.dart';
export 'src/omemo/stanza.dart';
export 'src/trust/base.dart';
export 'src/trust/btbv.dart';
export 'src/x3dh/x3dh.dart';

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@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_message.dart';
const maxSkip = 1000;
class RatchetStep {
const RatchetStep(this.header, this.ciphertext);
final OmemoMessage header;
final List<int> ciphertext;
@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ class RatchetStep {
@immutable
class SkippedKey {
const SkippedKey(this.dh, this.n);
factory SkippedKey.fromJson(Map<String, dynamic> data) {
@ -54,7 +52,6 @@ class SkippedKey {
}
class OmemoDoubleRatchet {
OmemoDoubleRatchet(
this.dhs, // DHs
this.dhr, // DHr
@ -221,7 +218,7 @@ class OmemoDoubleRatchet {
ik,
ad,
{},
false,
true,
kexTimestamp,
null,
);

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@ -1,45 +1,46 @@
abstract class OmemoException {}
/// Triggered during X3DH if the signature if the SPK does verify to the actual SPK.
class InvalidSignatureException implements Exception {
class InvalidSignatureException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'The signature of the SPK does not match the provided signature';
}
/// Triggered by the Double Ratchet if the computed HMAC does not match the attached HMAC.
/// Triggered by the Session Manager if the computed HMAC does not match the attached HMAC.
class InvalidMessageHMACException implements Exception {
class InvalidMessageHMACException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'The computed HMAC does not match the provided HMAC';
}
/// Triggered by the Double Ratchet if skipping messages would cause skipping more than
/// MAXSKIP messages
class SkippingTooManyMessagesException implements Exception {
class SkippingTooManyMessagesException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'Skipping messages would cause a skip bigger than MAXSKIP';
}
/// Triggered by the Session Manager if the message key is not encrypted for the device.
class NotEncryptedForDeviceException implements Exception {
class NotEncryptedForDeviceException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'Not encrypted for this device';
}
/// Triggered by the Session Manager when there is no key for decrypting the message.
class NoDecryptionKeyException implements Exception {
class NoDecryptionKeyException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'No key available for decrypting the message';
}
/// Triggered by the Session Manager when the identifier of the used Signed Prekey
/// is neither the current SPK's identifier nor the old one's.
class UnknownSignedPrekeyException implements Exception {
class UnknownSignedPrekeyException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'Unknown Signed Prekey used.';
}
/// Triggered by the Session Manager when the received Key Exchange message does not meet
/// the requirement that a key exchange, given that the ratchet already exists, must be
/// sent after its creation.
class InvalidKeyExchangeException implements Exception {
class InvalidKeyExchangeException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'The key exchange was sent before the last kex finished';
}
/// Triggered by the Session Manager when a message's sequence number is smaller than we
/// expect it to be.
class MessageAlreadyDecryptedException implements Exception {
class MessageAlreadyDecryptedException extends OmemoException implements Exception {
String errMsg() => 'The message has already been decrypted';
}

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/errors.dart';
@immutable
class DecryptionResult {
const DecryptionResult(this.payload, this.error);
final String? payload;
final OmemoException? error;
}

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@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import 'package:omemo_dart/src/x3dh/x3dh.dart';
/// This class represents an OmemoBundle but with all keypairs belonging to the keys
@immutable
class Device {
const Device(
this.jid,
this.id,

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@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
@immutable
class EncryptionResult {
const EncryptionResult(this.ciphertext, this.encryptedKeys);
/// The actual message that was encrypted

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@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:collection';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:collection/collection.dart';
import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
import 'package:logging/logging.dart';
import 'package:meta/meta.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/crypto.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/double_ratchet/double_ratchet.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/errors.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/helpers.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/keys.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/bundle.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/decryption_result.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/device.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encryption_result.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/events.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/ratchet_map_key.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/stanza.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_authenticated_message.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_key_exchange.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_message.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/base.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/x3dh/x3dh.dart';
import 'package:synchronized/synchronized.dart';
/// The info used for when encrypting the AES key for the actual payload.
const omemoPayloadInfoString = 'OMEMO Payload';
class OmemoManager {
OmemoManager(
this._device,
this._trustManager,
this.sendEmptyOmemoMessage,
this.fetchDeviceList,
this.fetchDeviceBundle,
);
final Logger _log = Logger('OmemoManager');
/// Functions for connecting with the OMEMO library
final Future<void> Function(EncryptionResult result, String recipientJid) sendEmptyOmemoMessage;
final Future<List<int>> Function(String jid) fetchDeviceList;
final Future<OmemoBundle?> Function(String jid, int id) fetchDeviceBundle;
/// Map bare JID to its known devices
Map<String, List<int>> _deviceList = {};
/// Map bare JIDs to whether we already requested the device list once
final Map<String, bool> _deviceListRequested = {};
/// Map bare a ratchet key to its ratchet. Note that this is also locked by
/// _ratchetCriticalSectionLock.
Map<RatchetMapKey, OmemoDoubleRatchet> _ratchetMap = {};
/// For preventing a race condition in encryption/decryption
final Map<String, Queue<Completer<void>>> _ratchetCriticalSectionQueue = {};
final Lock _ratchetCriticalSectionLock = Lock();
/// The OmemoManager's trust management
final TrustManager _trustManager;
TrustManager get trustManager => _trustManager;
/// Our own keys...
final Lock _deviceLock = Lock();
// ignore: prefer_final_fields
Device _device;
/// The event bus of the session manager
final StreamController<OmemoEvent> _eventStreamController = StreamController<OmemoEvent>.broadcast();
/// Enter the critical section for performing cryptographic operations on the ratchets
Future<void> _enterRatchetCriticalSection(String jid) async {
final completer = await _ratchetCriticalSectionLock.synchronized(() {
if (_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue.containsKey(jid)) {
final c = Completer<void>();
_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue[jid]!.addLast(c);
return c;
}
_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue[jid] = Queue();
return null;
});
if (completer != null) {
await completer.future;
}
}
/// Leave the critical section for the ratchets.
Future<void> _leaveRatchetCriticalSection(String jid) async {
await _ratchetCriticalSectionLock.synchronized(() {
if (_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue.containsKey(jid)) {
if (_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue[jid]!.isEmpty) {
_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue.remove(jid);
} else {
_ratchetCriticalSectionQueue[jid]!.removeFirst().complete();
}
}
});
}
Future<String?> _decryptAndVerifyHmac(List<int>? ciphertext, List<int> keyAndHmac) async {
// Empty OMEMO messages should just have the key decrypted and/or session set up.
if (ciphertext == null) {
return null;
}
final key = keyAndHmac.sublist(0, 32);
final hmac = keyAndHmac.sublist(32, 48);
final derivedKeys = await deriveEncryptionKeys(key, omemoPayloadInfoString);
final computedHmac = await truncatedHmac(ciphertext, derivedKeys.authenticationKey);
if (!listsEqual(hmac, computedHmac)) {
throw InvalidMessageHMACException();
}
return utf8.decode(
await aes256CbcDecrypt(ciphertext, derivedKeys.encryptionKey, derivedKeys.iv),
);
}
/// Add a session [ratchet] with the [deviceId] to the internal tracking state.
/// NOTE: Must be called from within the ratchet critical section.
void _addSession(String jid, int deviceId, OmemoDoubleRatchet ratchet) {
// Add the bundle Id
if (!_deviceList.containsKey(jid)) {
_deviceList[jid] = [deviceId];
// Commit the device map
_eventStreamController.add(DeviceMapModifiedEvent(_deviceList));
} else {
// Prevent having the same device multiple times in the list
if (!_deviceList[jid]!.contains(deviceId)) {
_deviceList[jid]!.add(deviceId);
// Commit the device map
_eventStreamController.add(DeviceMapModifiedEvent(_deviceList));
}
}
// Add the ratchet session
final key = RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId);
_ratchetMap[key] = ratchet;
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(RatchetModifiedEvent(jid, deviceId, ratchet, true));
}
/// Build a new session with the user at [jid] with the device [deviceId] using data
/// from the key exchange [kex]. In case [kex] contains an unknown Signed Prekey
/// identifier an UnknownSignedPrekeyException will be thrown.
Future<OmemoDoubleRatchet> _addSessionFromKeyExchange(String jid, int deviceId, OmemoKeyExchange kex) async {
// Pick the correct SPK
final device = await getDevice();
OmemoKeyPair spk;
if (kex.spkId == _device.spkId) {
spk = _device.spk;
} else if (kex.spkId == _device.oldSpkId) {
spk = _device.oldSpk!;
} else {
throw UnknownSignedPrekeyException();
}
final kexResult = await x3dhFromInitialMessage(
X3DHMessage(
OmemoPublicKey.fromBytes(kex.ik!, KeyPairType.ed25519),
OmemoPublicKey.fromBytes(kex.ek!, KeyPairType.x25519),
kex.pkId!,
),
spk,
device.opks.values.elementAt(kex.pkId!),
device.ik,
);
final ratchet = await OmemoDoubleRatchet.acceptNewSession(
spk,
OmemoPublicKey.fromBytes(kex.ik!, KeyPairType.ed25519),
kexResult.sk,
kexResult.ad,
getTimestamp(),
);
return ratchet;
}
/// Create a ratchet session initiated by Alice to the user with Jid [jid] and the device
/// [deviceId] from the bundle [bundle].
@visibleForTesting
Future<OmemoKeyExchange> addSessionFromBundle(String jid, int deviceId, OmemoBundle bundle) async {
final device = await getDevice();
final kexResult = await x3dhFromBundle(
bundle,
device.ik,
);
final ratchet = await OmemoDoubleRatchet.initiateNewSession(
bundle.spk,
bundle.ik,
kexResult.sk,
kexResult.ad,
getTimestamp(),
);
await _trustManager.onNewSession(jid, deviceId);
_addSession(jid, deviceId, ratchet);
return OmemoKeyExchange()
..pkId = kexResult.opkId
..spkId = bundle.spkId
..ik = await device.ik.pk.getBytes()
..ek = await kexResult.ek.pk.getBytes();
}
/// In case a decryption error occurs, the Double Ratchet spec says to just restore
/// the ratchet to its old state. As such, this function restores the ratchet at
/// [mapKey] with [oldRatchet].
/// NOTE: Must be called from within the ratchet critical section
void _restoreRatchet(RatchetMapKey mapKey, OmemoDoubleRatchet oldRatchet) {
_log.finest('Restoring ratchet ${mapKey.jid}:${mapKey.deviceId} to ${oldRatchet.nr}');
_ratchetMap[mapKey] = oldRatchet;
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(
RatchetModifiedEvent(
mapKey.jid,
mapKey.deviceId,
oldRatchet,
false,
),
);
}
/// Attempt to decrypt [ciphertext]. [keys] refers to the <key /> elements inside the
/// <keys /> element with a "jid" attribute matching our own. [senderJid] refers to the
/// bare Jid of the sender. [senderDeviceId] refers to the "sid" attribute of the
/// <encrypted /> element.
/// [timestamp] refers to the time the message was sent. This might be either what the
/// server tells you via "XEP-0203: Delayed Delivery" or the point in time at which
/// you received the stanza, if no Delayed Delivery element was found.
///
/// If the received message is an empty OMEMO message, i.e. there is no <payload />
/// element, then [ciphertext] must be set to null. In this case, this function
/// will return null as there is no message to be decrypted. This, however, is used
/// to set up sessions or advance the ratchets.
Future<String?> decryptMessage(List<int>? ciphertext, String senderJid, int senderDeviceId, List<EncryptedKey> keys, int timestamp) async {
// Try to find a session we can decrypt with.
var device = await getDevice();
final rawKey = keys.firstWhereOrNull((key) => key.rid == device.id);
if (rawKey == null) {
throw NotEncryptedForDeviceException();
}
final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(senderJid, senderDeviceId);
final decodedRawKey = base64.decode(rawKey.value);
List<int>? keyAndHmac;
OmemoAuthenticatedMessage authMessage;
OmemoDoubleRatchet? oldRatchet;
OmemoMessage? message;
if (rawKey.kex) {
// If the ratchet already existed, we store it. If it didn't, oldRatchet will stay
// null.
final oldRatchet = _getRatchet(ratchetKey)?.clone();
final kex = OmemoKeyExchange.fromBuffer(decodedRawKey);
authMessage = kex.message!;
message = OmemoMessage.fromBuffer(authMessage.message!);
// Guard against old key exchanges
if (oldRatchet != null) {
_log.finest('KEX for existent ratchet. ${oldRatchet.pn}');
if (oldRatchet.kexTimestamp > timestamp) {
throw InvalidKeyExchangeException();
}
// Try to decrypt it
try {
final decrypted = await oldRatchet.ratchetDecrypt(message, authMessage.writeToBuffer());
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(
RatchetModifiedEvent(
senderJid,
senderDeviceId,
oldRatchet,
false,
),
);
final plaintext = await _decryptAndVerifyHmac(
ciphertext,
decrypted,
);
_addSession(senderJid, senderDeviceId, oldRatchet);
return plaintext;
} catch (_) {
_log.finest('Failed to use old ratchet with KEX for existing ratchet');
}
}
final r = await _addSessionFromKeyExchange(senderJid, senderDeviceId, kex);
await _trustManager.onNewSession(senderJid, senderDeviceId);
_addSession(senderJid, senderDeviceId, r);
// Replace the OPK
// TODO(PapaTutuWawa): Replace the OPK when we know that the KEX worked
await _deviceLock.synchronized(() async {
device = await device.replaceOnetimePrekey(kex.pkId!);
// Commit the device
_eventStreamController.add(DeviceModifiedEvent(device));
});
} else {
authMessage = OmemoAuthenticatedMessage.fromBuffer(decodedRawKey);
message = OmemoMessage.fromBuffer(authMessage.message!);
}
final devices = _deviceList[senderJid];
if (devices == null) {
throw NoDecryptionKeyException();
}
if (!devices.contains(senderDeviceId)) {
throw NoDecryptionKeyException();
}
// We can guarantee that the ratchet exists at this point in time
final ratchet = _getRatchet(ratchetKey)!;
oldRatchet ??= ratchet.clone();
try {
if (rawKey.kex) {
keyAndHmac = await ratchet.ratchetDecrypt(message, authMessage.writeToBuffer());
} else {
keyAndHmac = await ratchet.ratchetDecrypt(message, decodedRawKey);
}
} catch (_) {
_restoreRatchet(ratchetKey, oldRatchet);
rethrow;
}
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(
RatchetModifiedEvent(
senderJid,
senderDeviceId,
ratchet,
false,
),
);
try {
return _decryptAndVerifyHmac(ciphertext, keyAndHmac);
} catch (_) {
_restoreRatchet(ratchetKey, oldRatchet);
rethrow;
}
}
/// Returns, if it exists, the ratchet associated with [key].
/// NOTE: Must be called from within the ratchet critical section.
OmemoDoubleRatchet? _getRatchet(RatchetMapKey key) => _ratchetMap[key];
/// Figure out what bundles we have to still build a session with.
Future<List<OmemoBundle>> _fetchNewBundles(String jid) async {
// Check if we already requested the device list for [jid]
List<int> bundlesToFetch;
if (!_deviceListRequested.containsKey(jid) || !_deviceList.containsKey(jid)) {
// We don't have an up-to-date version of the device list
final newDeviceList = await fetchDeviceList(jid);
_deviceList[jid] = newDeviceList;
bundlesToFetch = newDeviceList
.where((id) {
return !_ratchetMap.containsKey(RatchetMapKey(jid, id)) ||
_deviceList[jid]?.contains(id) == false;
}).toList();
} else {
// We already have an up-to-date version of the device list
bundlesToFetch = _deviceList[jid]!
.where((id) => !_ratchetMap.containsKey(RatchetMapKey(jid, id)))
.toList();
}
final newBundles = List<OmemoBundle>.empty(growable: true);
for (final id in bundlesToFetch) {
final bundle = await fetchDeviceBundle(jid, id);
if (bundle != null) newBundles.add(bundle);
}
return newBundles;
}
/// Encrypt the key [plaintext] for all known bundles of the Jids in [jids]. Returns a
/// map that maps the device Id to the ciphertext of [plaintext].
///
/// If [plaintext] is null, then the result will be an empty OMEMO message, i.e. one that
/// does not contain a <payload /> element. This means that the ciphertext attribute of
/// the result will be null as well.
/// NOTE: Must be called within the ratchet critical section
Future<EncryptionResult> _encryptToJids(List<String> jids, String? plaintext) async {
final encryptedKeys = List<EncryptedKey>.empty(growable: true);
var ciphertext = const <int>[];
var keyPayload = const <int>[];
if (plaintext != null) {
// Generate the key and encrypt the plaintext
final key = generateRandomBytes(32);
final keys = await deriveEncryptionKeys(key, omemoPayloadInfoString);
ciphertext = await aes256CbcEncrypt(
utf8.encode(plaintext),
keys.encryptionKey,
keys.iv,
);
final hmac = await truncatedHmac(ciphertext, keys.authenticationKey);
keyPayload = concat([key, hmac]);
} else {
keyPayload = List<int>.filled(32, 0x0);
}
final kex = <int, OmemoKeyExchange>{};
for (final jid in jids) {
for (final newSession in await _fetchNewBundles(jid)) {
kex[newSession.id] = await addSessionFromBundle(
newSession.jid,
newSession.id,
newSession,
);
}
}
// We assume that the user already checked if the session exists
for (final jid in jids) {
for (final deviceId in _deviceList[jid]!) {
// Empty OMEMO messages are allowed to bypass trust
if (plaintext != null) {
// Only encrypt to devices that are trusted
if (!(await _trustManager.isTrusted(jid, deviceId))) continue;
// Only encrypt to devices that are enabled
if (!(await _trustManager.isEnabled(jid, deviceId))) continue;
}
final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId);
var ratchet = _ratchetMap[ratchetKey]!;
final ciphertext = (await ratchet.ratchetEncrypt(keyPayload)).ciphertext;
if (kex.isNotEmpty && kex.containsKey(deviceId)) {
// The ratchet did not exist
final k = kex[deviceId]!
..message = OmemoAuthenticatedMessage.fromBuffer(ciphertext);
final buffer = base64.encode(k.writeToBuffer());
encryptedKeys.add(
EncryptedKey(
jid,
deviceId,
buffer,
true,
),
);
ratchet = ratchet.cloneWithKex(buffer);
_ratchetMap[ratchetKey] = ratchet;
} else if (!ratchet.acknowledged) {
// The ratchet exists but is not acked
if (ratchet.kex != null) {
final oldKex = OmemoKeyExchange.fromBuffer(base64.decode(ratchet.kex!))
..message = OmemoAuthenticatedMessage.fromBuffer(ciphertext);
encryptedKeys.add(
EncryptedKey(
jid,
deviceId,
base64.encode(oldKex.writeToBuffer()),
true,
),
);
} else {
// The ratchet is not acked but we don't have the old key exchange
_log.warning('Ratchet for $jid:$deviceId is not acked but the kex attribute is null');
encryptedKeys.add(
EncryptedKey(
jid,
deviceId,
base64.encode(ciphertext),
false,
),
);
}
} else {
// The ratchet exists and is acked
encryptedKeys.add(
EncryptedKey(
jid,
deviceId,
base64.encode(ciphertext),
false,
),
);
}
// Commit the ratchet
_eventStreamController.add(RatchetModifiedEvent(jid, deviceId, ratchet, false));
}
}
return EncryptionResult(
plaintext != null ? ciphertext : null,
encryptedKeys,
);
}
Future<DecryptionResult> onIncomingStanza(OmemoIncomingStanza stanza) async {
await _enterRatchetCriticalSection(stanza.bareSenderJid);
final ratchetKey = RatchetMapKey(stanza.bareSenderJid, stanza.senderDeviceId);
final ratchetCreated = !_ratchetMap.containsKey(ratchetKey);
String? payload;
try {
payload = await decryptMessage(
base64.decode(stanza.payload),
stanza.bareSenderJid,
stanza.senderDeviceId,
stanza.keys,
stanza.timestamp,
);
} on OmemoException catch (ex) {
await _leaveRatchetCriticalSection(stanza.bareSenderJid);
return DecryptionResult(
null,
ex,
);
}
// Check if the ratchet is acked
final ratchet = _getRatchet(ratchetKey);
assert(ratchet != null, 'We decrypted the message, so the ratchet must exist');
if (ratchet!.nr > 53) {
await sendEmptyOmemoMessage(
await _encryptToJids(
[stanza.bareSenderJid],
null,
),
stanza.bareSenderJid,
);
}
// Ratchet is acked
if (!ratchetCreated && ratchet.acknowledged) {
await _leaveRatchetCriticalSection(stanza.bareSenderJid);
return DecryptionResult(
payload,
null,
);
}
// Ratchet is not acked. Mark as acked and send an empty OMEMO message.
await ratchetAcknowledged(
stanza.bareSenderJid,
stanza.senderDeviceId,
enterCriticalSection: false,
);
await sendEmptyOmemoMessage(
await _encryptToJids(
[stanza.bareSenderJid],
null,
),
stanza.bareSenderJid,
);
await _leaveRatchetCriticalSection(stanza.bareSenderJid);
return DecryptionResult(
payload,
null,
);
}
Future<EncryptionResult?> onOutgoingStanza(OmemoOutgoingStanza stanza) async {
return _encryptToJids(
stanza.recipientJids,
stanza.payload,
);
}
/// Mark the ratchet for device [deviceId] from [jid] as acked.
Future<void> ratchetAcknowledged(String jid, int deviceId, { bool enterCriticalSection = true }) async {
if (enterCriticalSection) await _enterRatchetCriticalSection(jid);
final ratchet = _ratchetMap[RatchetMapKey(jid, deviceId)]!
..acknowledged = true;
// Commit it
_eventStreamController.add(RatchetModifiedEvent(jid, deviceId, ratchet, false));
if (enterCriticalSection) await _leaveRatchetCriticalSection(jid);
}
Future<Device> getDevice() => _deviceLock.synchronized(() => _device);
/// Ensures that the device list is fetched again on the next message sending.
void onNewConnection() {
_deviceListRequested.clear();
}
/// Sets the device list for [jid] to [devices].
void onDeviceListUpdate(String jid, List<int> devices) {
_deviceList[jid] = devices;
_deviceListRequested[jid] = true;
}
List<int>? getDeviceListForJid(String jid) => _deviceList[jid];
void initialize(Map<RatchetMapKey, OmemoDoubleRatchet> ratchetMap, Map<String, List<int>> deviceList) {
_deviceList = deviceList;
_ratchetMap = ratchetMap;
}
}

25
lib/src/omemo/stanza.dart Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/encrypted_key.dart';
class OmemoIncomingStanza {
const OmemoIncomingStanza(
this.bareSenderJid,
this.senderDeviceId,
this.timestamp,
this.keys,
this.payload,
);
final String bareSenderJid;
final int senderDeviceId;
final int timestamp;
final List<EncryptedKey> keys;
final String payload;
}
class OmemoOutgoingStanza {
const OmemoOutgoingStanza(
this.recipientJids,
this.payload,
);
final List<String> recipientJids;
final String payload;
}

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@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/omemo_authenticated_message.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/protobuf/protobuf.dart';
class OmemoKeyExchange {
OmemoKeyExchange();
factory OmemoKeyExchange.fromBuffer(List<int> data) {

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test/omemomanager_test.dart Normal file
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import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:logging/logging.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/omemo_dart.dart';
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/omemo/omemomanager.dart' as omemo;
import 'package:omemo_dart/src/trust/always.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';
void main() {
Logger.root
..level = Level.ALL
..onRecord.listen((record) {
// ignore: avoid_print
print('${record.level.name}: ${record.message}');
});
test('Test sending a message without the device list cache', () async {
const aliceJid = 'alice@server1';
const bobJid = 'bob@server2';
var aliceEmptyMessageSent = 0;
var bobEmptyMessageSent = 0;
final aliceDevice = await Device.generateNewDevice(aliceJid, opkAmount: 1);
final bobDevice = await Device.generateNewDevice(bobJid, opkAmount: 1);
final aliceManager = omemo.OmemoManager(
aliceDevice,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
(result, recipientJid) async {
aliceEmptyMessageSent++;
},
(jid) async {
expect(jid, bobJid);
return [ bobDevice.id ];
},
(jid, id) async {
expect(jid, bobJid);
return bobDevice.toBundle();
},
);
final bobManager = omemo.OmemoManager(
bobDevice,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
(result, recipientJid) async {
bobEmptyMessageSent++;
},
(jid) async {
expect(jid, aliceJid);
return [aliceDevice.id];
},
(jid, id) async {
expect(jid, aliceJid);
return aliceDevice.toBundle();
},
);
// Alice sends a message
final aliceResult = await aliceManager.onOutgoingStanza(
const OmemoOutgoingStanza(
[bobJid],
'Hello world',
),
);
// Bob must be able to decrypt the message
final bobResult = await bobManager.onIncomingStanza(
OmemoIncomingStanza(
aliceJid,
aliceDevice.id,
DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch,
aliceResult!.encryptedKeys,
base64.encode(aliceResult.ciphertext!),
),
);
expect(aliceEmptyMessageSent, 0);
expect(bobEmptyMessageSent, 1);
expect(bobResult.payload, 'Hello world');
// Alice receives the ack message
await aliceManager.ratchetAcknowledged(
bobJid,
bobDevice.id,
);
// Bob now responds
final bobResult2 = await bobManager.onOutgoingStanza(
const OmemoOutgoingStanza(
[aliceJid],
'Hello world, Alice',
),
);
final aliceResult2 = await aliceManager.onIncomingStanza(
OmemoIncomingStanza(
bobJid,
bobDevice.id,
DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch,
bobResult2!.encryptedKeys,
base64.encode(bobResult2.ciphertext!),
),
);
expect(aliceResult2.error, null);
expect(aliceEmptyMessageSent, 0);
expect(bobEmptyMessageSent, 1);
expect(aliceResult2.payload, 'Hello world, Alice');
});
test('Test triggering the heartbeat', () async {
const aliceJid = 'alice@server1';
const bobJid = 'bob@server2';
var aliceEmptyMessageSent = 0;
var bobEmptyMessageSent = 0;
final aliceDevice = await Device.generateNewDevice(aliceJid, opkAmount: 1);
final bobDevice = await Device.generateNewDevice(bobJid, opkAmount: 1);
final aliceManager = omemo.OmemoManager(
aliceDevice,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
(result, recipientJid) async {
aliceEmptyMessageSent++;
},
(jid) async {
expect(jid, bobJid);
return [ bobDevice.id ];
},
(jid, id) async {
expect(jid, bobJid);
return bobDevice.toBundle();
},
);
final bobManager = omemo.OmemoManager(
bobDevice,
AlwaysTrustingTrustManager(),
(result, recipientJid) async {
bobEmptyMessageSent++;
},
(jid) async {
expect(jid, aliceJid);
return [aliceDevice.id];
},
(jid, id) async {
expect(jid, aliceJid);
return aliceDevice.toBundle();
},
);
// Alice sends a message
final aliceResult = await aliceManager.onOutgoingStanza(
const OmemoOutgoingStanza(
[bobJid],
'Hello world',
),
);
// Bob must be able to decrypt the message
final bobResult = await bobManager.onIncomingStanza(
OmemoIncomingStanza(
aliceJid,
aliceDevice.id,
DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch,
aliceResult!.encryptedKeys,
base64.encode(aliceResult.ciphertext!),
),
);
expect(aliceEmptyMessageSent, 0);
expect(bobEmptyMessageSent, 1);
expect(bobResult.payload, 'Hello world');
// Bob acknowledges the message
await aliceManager.ratchetAcknowledged(bobJid, bobDevice.id);
// Alice now sends 52 messages that Bob decrypts
for (var i = 0; i <= 51; i++) {
final aliceResultLoop = await aliceManager.onOutgoingStanza(
OmemoOutgoingStanza(
[bobJid],
'Test message $i',
),
);
final bobResultLoop = await bobManager.onIncomingStanza(
OmemoIncomingStanza(
aliceJid,
aliceDevice.id,
DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch,
aliceResultLoop!.encryptedKeys,
base64.encode(aliceResultLoop.ciphertext!),
),
);
expect(aliceEmptyMessageSent, 0);
expect(bobEmptyMessageSent, 1);
expect(bobResultLoop.payload, 'Test message $i');
}
// Alice sends a final message that triggers a heartbeat
final aliceResultFinal = await aliceManager.onOutgoingStanza(
const OmemoOutgoingStanza(
[bobJid],
'Test message last',
),
);
final bobResultFinal = await bobManager.onIncomingStanza(
OmemoIncomingStanza(
aliceJid,
aliceDevice.id,
DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch,
aliceResultFinal!.encryptedKeys,
base64.encode(aliceResultFinal.ciphertext!),
),
);
expect(aliceEmptyMessageSent, 0);
expect(bobEmptyMessageSent, 2);
expect(bobResultFinal.payload, 'Test message last');
});
}